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BACKGROUND: There is growing concern about
low farm incomes and stagnant or declining
agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Poor soil quality, due in large part to low levels of
fertilizer use, is considered by many to be one
principal reason for these problems.
In much of Sub-Saharan Africa, demand for
fertilizer was developed based on “cash-crop”
systems, usually based on non-cereal export crops
— cotton, tea, coffee, fruits, vegetables, and
tobacco. In these systems, there is credit for
fertilizer and profitable and stable outlets for the
product for both small- and large-scale farmers.
Non-cereal crops, however, occupy only a small
share of land compared to cereals in most African
countries, and are thus not motors for broad
increases in fertilizer use to raise smallholder
productivity and food security. Moreover, the Green
Revolution in Asia was due in large part to
intensification of cereal rather than export crops. To
date, however, only a few countries (Nigeria, Kenya,
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and more recently Ethiopia)
have developed national programs to promote
fertilizer use on smallholders’ cereal fields. 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODS: Our research
focuses on two of the above cases — Zambia and
Zimbabwe. We believe that these cases hold great
interest for other African countries currently
contemplating alternative policies to stimulate use of
fertilizer on small farms. 
The principal objective of our research was to
document, compare, and evaluate changes in the
structure, conduct, and performance of the fertilizer
sectors in Zimbabwe and Zambia, and to draw
implications for other countries in Africa attempting to
increase fertilizer use on small farms. The research
covers the past three decades, over which fertilizer
policies and fertilizer systems changed substantially.
The research draws on an extensive review of
published and unpublished documents plus interviews
conducted by Dr. Rusike during 1996 and 1997 with
managers of fertilizer companies and agribusiness
consulting firms, researchers and policymakers,
representatives of farmer organizations, and field
officers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
POLICIES, STRUCTURE, AND CONDUCT OF
THE FERTILIZER SYSTEM, 1970s TO THE
PRESENT: Fertilizer research, extension, and
distribution during the colonial and immediate post-
colonial period focused on large-scale and selected
small-scale farmers especially in areas with higher
rainfall. Only a few types of fertilizer were marketed,
and extension services recommended uniform and high
rates of fertilizer application that were often not
profitable for typical smallholders.
In the 1980s, governments in both countries used input
and credit subsidies and public market infrastructure
to improve smallholder access to fertilizer to increase
maize production to improve national food security
and farm incomes via intensification and 
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commercialization of smallholder cereal production.
The new policies included: (a) the creation of a
countrywide network of subsidized depots where
maize had a guaranteed market and fertilizer and
seed were readily available; (b) pan-territorial and
pan-seasonal pricing for maize and fertilizer; (c)
price subsidies for fertilizer; and (d) input loans to
smallholders at negative real interest rates, with lax
enforcement of repayment. 
But the public support system was not fiscally
sustainable due to the high cost of subsidizing the
various components and the high rates of default for
repayment of input loans. Despite its success in
raising smallholder fertilizer use, the 1980s policies
created inefficiencies and uneconomic patterns of
maize production. (Pan-territorial pricing made it
artificially profitable to produce maize in remote
areas with high transport costs.)
Reforms were thus instituted in the 1990s as part of
the Structural Adjustment Programs. Import and
distribution of fertilizer were gradually liberalized
and privatized, public marketing depots were cut,
and maize and input prices were partially or fully
decontrolled.
During the 1990s, the governments also took
measures to deal with challenges related to the
transition to a liberalized fertilizer market. To deal
with competition from South African companies,
perceived as engaged in predatory marketing, the
Zimbabwe government continued protection (via
tariffs and regulations) of the fertilizer market —
spurred by lobbying by national companies. To deal
with the effects of drought that undermined fertilizer
demand at the outset of reforms, the Zimbabwean
government distributed free fertilizer and seed to
smallholders in its Drought Relief Recovery “Crop
Pack Program” from 1992 to 1997. To deal with the
potential problem of inadequate access to fertilizer
credit after the elimination of the public rural credit
system, in 1994 the Zambian government began
financing credit through Cavmont Merchant Bank
and Société Générale de Surveillance. These banks
acted as on-lenders to private dealers and stockists,
who in turn lent fertilizer to farmers. The system has
worked poorly, however, with low recovery rates (in
1996, a mere 27 percent.)
Largeholders have reacted to the loss of the subsidies
and maize market guarantees by shifting from maize
toward fruit, vegetables, and tobacco. Fertilizer
companies have responded to these shifts by providing
blends, and high solubility and high-analysis
fertilizers. The latter cost less to transport. 
Although the response of fertilizer companies to the
needs of the commercial sector has been more rapid
and complete than that to semi-subsistence
smallholders, some firms are starting to compete for
the (cereal-based) smallholder fertilizer market via
innovations that address smallholder market problems.
Following are examples: (a) small-medium trading
firms are setting up in smallholder areas where they
can get to know clients and establish local links for
maize and fertilizer trading and credit. In Zambia,
some provide fertilizer on credit through the
government-subsidized scheme, with repayment rates
of up to 80 percent; (b) the South African company,
Omnia, has set up a maize-for-fertilizer barter system
in Zambia to redress limited credit availability and low
repayment; and (c) Zimbabwean manufacturers
experimented with the marketing of low-analysis
fertilizers such as partially acidulated phosphates
(from rock phosphate) for the smallholder market. 
NGOs and farmer organizations are undertaking pilot
schemes to raise smallholder access to fertilizer. For
example, the CARE AGENT program identifies
village-level stockists, provides them with technical
training and guarantees short-term credit. CARE then
aggregates orders from field agents and tenders them
for bid. Orders are filled and delivered by local
suppliers.
PERFORMANCE CHANGES OVER THE 1980s-
1990s: Total fertilizer use rose in both countries in the
1980s, but then fell in the 1990s, especially in
Zambia. In Zimbabwe, total fertilizer use per year
declined slightly from roughly 510,000 tons in 1981-
1989 to 490,000 tons in 1990-1996. In Zambia, total
fertilizer use per year averaged 210,000-230,000 tons
from 1980 to 1992. After the general liberalization
and market subsidy cut in 1992, the yearly average
dropped significantly to 160,000 tons. 
The smallholders’ share of total fertilizer use declined
in Zambia (70 percent of the total in the 1980s, 60 
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percent in the 1990s). It stayed steady between the
two periods in Zimbabwe (at about 25 percent), but
would have declined in the 1990s had it not been for
fertilizer aid. 
The reasons for the faster fall in Zambia’s fertilizer
use are: (a) the smallholder share in total fertilizer
use is much higher in Zambia; (b) Zambia has
poorer roads (and thus higher transport costs) in
smallholder areas; and (c) the maize/fertilizer price
ratio stayed relatively stable over the two decades in
Zimbabwe, but in Zambia fell from an average of
0.7 to 0.4 from 1980-1985 to 1990-1995.
LESSONS: The current struggles of the
governments and the private-sector actors in Zambia
and Zimbabwe to address the constraints to
increasing the smallholder, maize-based market for
fertilizer should be of great interest to other African
countries. Key lessons follow. (1) Efforts to increase
fertilizer use on small cereal farms in Africa are
plagued with fundamental problems such as
climatic risk; a dearth of technology packages that
are farmer tested to be profitable and risk-
decreasing, especially in less-favorable agroclimatic
zones; lack of technical/management skills and
information on application rates and agronomic
methods to increase the efficiency and profitability
of fertilizer use; high transport costs;
underdeveloped credit markets; and risky output
markets. Sustainable strategies for increasing
fertilizer use must address these fundamental
problems.
(2) It is not surprising that smallholder fertilizer use
rose dramatically in Zambia and Zimbabwe during
the 1980s because the fundamental problems were
addressed through state intervention and subsidy,
using methods common in “cash crop schemes”
elsewhere (guaranteed output markets, subsidized
inputs and credit, and extension). It was also crucial
that an improved technology package was available
(improved varieties with good fertilizer
responsiveness and strong consumer demand)
although this package worked best in more favorable
agroclimates. But the subsidies and guaranteed
markets proved to be fiscally unsustainable.
(3) It is also not surprising that fertilizer market
liberalization in the 1990s was not a panacea. Despite
more business competition for the largeholder fertilizer
market, smallholder fertilizer purchases dropped
because the fundamental problems were not
resolved by liberalization alone. 
(4) Fertilizer manufacturers and traders know that the
persistence of the fundamental problems undermines
their profitably serving the smallholder market. They
have taken initial steps to address those problems —
for example, fertilizer barter schemes to obviate credit
problems; new, cheaper products to fit smallholder
needs; private extension efforts; and location in
smallholder areas.
(5) NGOs and farmer organizations recognize that
business efforts will not yet be enough to substantially
increase smallholder access to fertilizer. Those
organizations have developed pilot projects to train
farmers, and serve as their intermediaries with
fertilizer firms to reduce the risk of credit and
transactions. 
(6) There are, however, crucial actions for
governments to undertake — to create conditions that
develop the incentives and capacity of the private
sector to invest in building fertilizer markets
accessible to smallholders. These public actions are
discussed below. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: The most
promising roles for a government action center on
addressing the fundamental problems discussed above;
that will help fertilizer firms as well as farmers come
to a mutually beneficial market solution. A secondary
role involves regulating the emerging market to best
serve smallholders needs. Specifics follow.
(1)  A poor infrastructure in smallholder areas
undermines the development of a cereal-based
fertilizer market. Governments should invest in
roads, telecommunications, and other physical
infrastructure that will reduce costs to trading
companies and farmers. 
(2)  Order needs to be put into the “rules of the
game” in the emerging fertilizer market to protect
and benefit the weakest players, the smallholders 
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and the small-medium trading companies.
Regulation of the market through testing and
registration of products will help to control quality
in fertilizers in the new liberalized markets where
many new products are entering. 
(3) Small farmers need a wide range of profitable
and risk-reducing technology packages, and skills
and information to participate in the emerging
markets. The piecemeal efforts of companies or
NGOs provide inadequate coverage. Public action is
needed in three areas: (a) breeding and agronomic
research and extension that help develop site-
specific fertilizer recommendations and help
smallholders use fertilizer more efficiently (via
complementary measures such as organic matter
application and soil conservation investments, and
via access to improved varieties); (b) research and
extension (including soil testing services) to help
smallholders judge which fertilizers are
agronomically appropriate and profitable; and (c)
market and product information systems to inform
farmers of changing prices and types of fertilizer
available on the market.
(4)  The emergence and development of small-
medium trading companies need to be
encouraged as it is critical to access fertilizer and
credit for smallholders. Three actions are
important to that end: (a) public market information
services can help inform these firms of changing
prices, fertilizer import opportunities, keep abreast
of manufacturers’ new products, of regulations and
registration, and of opportunities for business
linkages with larger firms; (b) training will help
these firms deal with the risk of the smallholder
market; and (c) improvement of the judicial system
for contract enforcement will reduce the risk they
face.
(5) Price and production risk can undermine an
emerging fertilizer market. And that risk is
particularly important in smallholder, rainfed cereal
production areas. A very expensive solution to
climatic risk is widespread irrigation, which is
prohibitively expensive in most countries. More
promising is breeding for short-cycle cereal varieties
that better handle drought and short growing seasons
than do current varieties. More regional trade in
maize will decrease price fluctuations and reduce
market risk, and that trade can be encouraged by
policies that promote market integration and free
flow of goods. Encouraging small-scale processing
of maize will develop market outlets and thus
increased profitability for smallholder maize.
POLICY ISSUES FOR FURTHER DEBATE
AND RESEARCH: The following are pressing
unresolved issues in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and
should also be on the agenda for debate in other
countries pursuing cereal-based development of
fertilizer demand.  
(1) What are the costs and benefits of alternative
approaches to spurring private investment in
fertilizer marketing? This is a priority, especially
with respect to the scaling-up of current pilot schemes
by businesses, NGOs, and governments, and to
selection of infrastructure investments.
(2)  What degree of dependence on NGOs is
desirable?  Their services are not necessarily cheaper
than public provision of fertilizer-related services.
There has been little analysis of their cost
effectiveness relative to alternatives.
(3) What would be the implications of losing
domestic fertilizer production capacity in
Zimbabwe to foreign competition in an increasingly
regional market? What actions, if any, should be
taken to maintain it? Given the need in the next two
decades for much more fertilizer than domestic firms
can produce, it will be hard to maintain protection and
still meet fertilizer needs. How can investment and
competition be spurred but also "level the playing
field?" 
(4) What role should there be for relief in the form
of fertilizer aid? This can temporarily fill a void in
market coverage, and help farmers in the short run.
However, preliminary evidence suggests such aid is
costly and can provide a disincentive to private
fertilizer traders.
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